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a b s t r a c t
Service-Oriented Architectures (SOAs) provide methods and tech-
nologies for modelling, programming and deploying software
applications that can run over globally available network infras-
tructures. Current software engineering technologies for SOAs,
however, remain at the descriptive level and lack rigorous foun-
dations enabling formal analysis of service-oriented models and
software. To support automated verification of service proper-
ties by relying on mathematically founded techniques, we have
developed a software tool that we called Venus (Verification
ENvironment for UML models of Services). Our tool takes as an
input service models specified by UML 2.0 activity diagrams ac-
cording to the UML4SOA profile, while its theoretical bases are the
process calculus COWS and the temporal logic SocL. A key fea-
ture of Venus is that it provides access to verification functional-
ities also to those users not familiar with formal methods. Indeed,
the tool works by first automatically translating UML4SOA mod-
els and natural language statements of service properties into,
respectively, COWS terms and SocL formulae, and then by auto-
matically model checking the formulae over the COWS terms. In
this paper we present the tool, its architecture and its enabling
technologies by also illustrating the verification of a classical ‘travel
agency’ scenario.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
✩ This work is a revised and extended version of Banti et al. (2009b) and has been partially supported by the EU project
Sensoria, IST-2005-016004.
E-mail addresses: fbanti@gmail.com (F. Banti), rosario.pugliese@unifi.it (R. Pugliese), tiezzi@dsi.unifi.it (F. Tiezzi).
1 Tel.: +39 055 4237436.
0747-7171/$ – see front matter© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jsc.2010.08.005
120 F. Banti et al. / Journal of Symbolic Computation 46 (2011) 119–149
1. Introduction
Service-Oriented Architectures (SOAs) provide methods and technologies for programming and
deploying software applications that can run over globally available network infrastructures. The
most successful instantiations of the SOA paradigm are probably the so called web services. These
are independent and, in general, loosely coupled computational entities, accessible by humans and
other services through the Web, widely differing in their internal architecture and, possibly, in
their implementation languages. Different services are often combined together to form service-
based systems, also called service orchestrations, where service components are usually implemented
by different software developing groups. Service orchestrations may themselves become services,
making composition a recursive operation.
Both stand-alone and composed services usually have requirements like, e.g., service availability,
functional correctness, and protection of private data. Implementing services satisfying these require-
ments demands the use of rigorous software engineering methodologies encompassing the various
phases of the software development process, frommodelling to deployment, and exploiting methods
for qualitative and quantitative verification. The goal is to initially specify the services using a high-
level, possibly graphical, modelling language, thus also providing a human understandable common
view of the system, and then to drive the software development process towards implementations
complying with the initial specification. For this methodology to be feasible and effective, it is then
fundamental to guarantee the correctness of the initialmodels. Therefore, in this paperweput forward
an approach based on formal methods for verifying behavioral properties of service models.
Currently, the most widely used language for modelling software systems is UML (Object
Management Group, 2007a). It is intuitive, powerful, and extensible. Recently, a UML 2.0 profile,
christened UML4SOA (Mayer et al., 2008b), has been designed for modeling SOAs. We focus our
attention on UML4SOA activity diagrams since they express the behavioral aspects of services, which
we are mainly interested in. Inspired by the OASIS standard for orchestrating web services WS-
BPEL (OASIS WSBPEL TC, 2007), UML4SOA activity diagrams integrate UML with specialized actions
for exchanging messages among services, specialized structured activity nodes and activity edges
for representing scopes equipped with event, fault and compensation handlers. However, UML in
general, andUML4SOA in particular, falls short of providing formal semantics and rigorous verification
techniques for its models and their properties, and must hence be regarded as an informal modelling
language. Furthermore, sinceUML4SOA specifications are staticmodels, they are not suitable for direct
automated analysis.
On the contrary, formal verification methods are usually based on mathematically founded
theoretical frameworks. For example, process calculi, state machines, Petri nets, temporal and modal
logics are widely used for the specification and verification of concurrent and distributed systems.
Many research efforts have been recently devoted to devise proper process calculi (see, e.g., Bocchi
et al., 2003; Butler et al., 2005; Geguang et al., 2005; Guidi et al., 2006; Ferrari et al., 2006; Lapadula
et al., 2007a; Lanese et al., 2007; Prandi and Quaglia, 2007; Carbone et al., 2007; Boreale et al., 2008;
Vieira et al., 2008; Bartoletti et al., 2008) and temporal logics (see, e.g., Fantechi et al., 2008; De
Nicola et al., in press) for formally specifying, simulating and verifying service behaviours. On the one
hand, due to their algebraic nature, process calculi convey in a distilled form the SOA compositional
programming style. On the other hand, temporal logics have long been used to represent properties
of concurrent and distributed systems owing to their ability of expressing notions of necessity,
possibility, eventuality, etc. (see e.g. Huth and Ryan, 2004). These logics have proved suitable to reason
about complex software systems because they only provide abstract specifications of these systems
and can thus be used for describing system properties rather than system behaviours. One successful
application of temporal logics to the analysis of systems, often supported by efficient software tools
(see e.g. Clarke et al., 1999; Geguang, 2008), ismodel checking.
While UML is quite well known and widely used within industrial contexts, the same cannot be
said of the formal methods we mentioned before that might still be too low level and impractical for
developers accustomed to work with abstract architectural models of systems. Thus, our aim is not
only to devise a viable approach for verifying behavioral properties of UMLmodels of services by ex-
ploiting process calculi and temporal logics, but also tomake such an approach accessible to people not
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Fig. 1. Venus interactions.
necessarily familiar with the formal methods which it relies on. The solution we illustrate hereafter is
to almost completely automate the verification process by means of a suitable software environment
shepherding the (non-expert) users to set the behavioral service properties they want to verify.
As a proof-of-concept of the applicability of our approach, we present the prototypical tool Venus
(Verification ENvironment for UML models of Services), whose interactions with the external world
are schematized in Fig. 1. Firstly, the tool asks the user to upload the UML4SOA activity diagrams
modelling the service scenario to be analysed. Then, the user is required to select the service properties
he wants to verify out of a predefined list of intuitive behavioral properties (described in Section 3
and taken from Fantechi et al. (2008)) that are written in natural language and are typically relevant
in most of service scenarios. For instance, the user might choose to check service availability, i.e. if the
service is always able to accept client requests, or service responsiveness, i.e. if the service guarantees at
least one response to each accepted request. An expert user may himself also write down additional
(possibly domain specific) properties he wants to check. All properties will be internally expressed
as logical formulae in terms of the actions the modelled service is expected to perform and of the
propositions that are true in its states. Next, the user is asked to select which are the operations
of the UML4SOA diagrams corresponding to the actions occurring in the selected properties. For
instance, to check service availability, the user is requested to specifywhich operation in the diagrams
corresponds to the action of accepting a client request. Finally, Venus checks the validity of the
properties by exploiting an internal model checker. In case a property does not hold, the tool can
provide a detailed explanation of the result, that is a so-called counterexample.
The above external behaviour hides from the users the technical details of what really happens
inside Venus during the verification process. The cornerstone of our tool is an automated encoding
from themodelling languageUML4SOA to the service-oriented calculusCOWS (Lapadula et al., 2007a).
This encoding permits to pass from a graphical notation to an internal representation with a formal
operational semantics. The rationale for our choice of COWS as the target calculus of the encoding
is its proximity to UML4SOA. In fact, in Banti et al. (2009a) we used COWS for translating by hand
UML4SOA activity diagrams to enable a subsequent analysis phase. There, we have experimented
that the specific mechanisms and primitives of COWS are particularly suitable for encoding services
specified by UML4SOA activity diagrams. This is not surprising if one considers that both UML4SOA
and COWS are inspired by WS-BPEL. The next step has been to define an encoding of UML4SOA
diagrams into COWS terms and implement it as an automatic tool. The encoding is compositional,
in the sense that the encoding of a service scenario is the parallel composition of the encoding of
its individual services and, moreover, the encoding of a UML4SOA activity diagram is the COWS term
resulting from the parallel composition of the encodings of its components. Additionally, our encoding
defines a transformational operational semantics forUML4SOAwhich is, to the best of our knowledge,
the only formal semantics of this modelling language.
The properties selected by the user are, in turn, translated into formulae of the branching-time
temporal logic SocL (Fantechi et al., 2008). This logic permits to express properties of services (like
the general properties predefined in Venus) in terms of states and state changes, and of the actions
that are performedwhenmoving fromone state to the other.SocL can express in an easyway peculiar
aspects of services, such as, e.g., acceptance of a request, provision of a response, and correlation
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among service requests and responses. This, together with the availability of CMC (Fantechi et al.,
2008), that is a model checker for SocL formulae over COWS terms, has motivated our choice of SocL
out of the several temporal logics proposed in the literature.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 first provides an overview of UML4SOA by
means of a classical ‘travel agency’ example and then presents our proposal of an alternative syntax for
UML4SOA. Section 3 presentsVenus and illustrates its usage by resorting to the travel agency example.
Section 4 briefly reviewsCOWS, while Section 5 presents theCOWS-based transformational semantics
of UML4SOA. Section 6 introduces SocL and CMC. Finally, Section 7 touches upon comparisons with
related work and directions for future work.
2. An overview of UML4SOA
We start by informally presentingUML4SOA through a realistic but simplified example, illustrated
in Fig. 2, based on the classical ‘travel agency’ scenario.
A travel agency exposes a service that automatically books a flight and a hotel according to the
requests of the user. The activity starts with a receive action for a message from a client containing
a request for a flight and a hotel (stored in reqData). Whenever prompted by a client request, the
service creates an instance to serve that specific request and is immediately ready to concurrently
serve other requests. Typically, in a service-oriented scenario, to ensure that eachmessage is delivered
to the proper service instance, along with the message some correlation data are exchanged that are
required to match the corresponding data known by the message receiver’s instance. In our scenario,
each service instance is uniquely identified by the value stored in the write-once variable id, which is,
from now onwards, included in every exchanged message.
Afterwards, by a send&receive action, the request is sent to a flight searching service (flightService)
and the servicewaits for a responsemessage thatwill be stored in the variables flightAnswer and fData.
As soon as this action is executed, a compensation handler is installed. The compensation consists of
a send action to the flight searching service of a message asking to delete the request. The received
answer is then checked by a decision node. If the answer is positive, similar actions are undertaken
for booking a hotel by means of a hotel searching service (hotelService). If this service also replies
positively, the reservation data (stored in fData and hData) are forwarded to the client and the activity
successfully terminates. Instead, if at least one answer is negative, an exception is raised by a raise
action. An exception may also be raised in response to an event consisting of an incoming message
from the client, and requiring to cancel his own request. All exceptions are caught by the exception
handler that through the action compensate all triggers all the compensations installed so far in reverse
order w.r.t. their completion, and notifies the client that his requests have not been fulfilled.
The other participants involved in the travel agency scenario are a client, a flight booking service
and a hotel booking service. For the sake of simplicity, we have considered a client that simply invokes
the agency service and waits for a response (it never requires a cancellation), and flight/hotel booking
services that, when invoked, non-deterministically reply either yes or no to every request and then
allow the agency service to delete the reservation. Notably, in case the agency service successfully
completes, flight/hotel booking service instances may wait for a deletion request indefinitely; in a
more realistic scenario, of course, such instances can be terminated by means of a timeout or the
receipt of a message indicating the success. The UML4SOA diagrams modelling such services are
shown in Figs. 3–5.
The syntax of UML4SOA is given in Mayer et al. (2008b) by a metamodel in classical UML-style. In
Fig. 6 we provide an alternative syntax that is more suitable for defining an encoding by induction on
the syntax of constructs. Each rectangle represents a grammar production of the form SYMBOL ::=
ALTER1 | . . . | ALTERn, where the non-terminal SYMBOL is in the top left corner (highlighted by a
gray background), while the alternativesALTER1, . . . ,ALTERn are the other elements of the rectangle.
To assign a name activityName to a UML4SOA construct we write it as activityName (i.e. using a sans
serif font in italic style) beside the construct.
To simplify the encoding and its expositionwe adopt somemild restrictions.We assume that every
action and scope has one incoming and one outgoing control flow edge (except for receiving actions
that may have no incoming edge), that a fork or decision node has one incoming edge, and that a
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Fig. 2. Travel agency scenario: agency service.
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Fig. 3. Travel agency scenario: the client service.
join or merge node has one outgoing edge. These restrictions do not compromise expressiveness of
the language and are usually implicitly adopted by most UML users for the sake of clarity. We also
omit many classicalUML constructs, in particular object flows, exception handlers, expansion regions
and several UML actions, since UML4SOA offers specialized versions of such constructs. Regarding
object flows, used for passing values among nodes, they become unnecessary since, for inter-service
communications,UML4SOA relies on input andoutput pins,while data are shared among the elements
of a scope by storing them in variables.
AUML4SOA application is a finite set of orchestrationsORC. We use orc to range over orchestration
names. An orchestration is an activity enclosing one top level scope with, possibly, several nested
scopes. A SCOPE is a structured activity that permits explicitly grouping activities together with
their own associated variables, references to partner services, event handlers, and a fault and a
compensation handler. A list of variables is generated by the following grammar:
VARS ::= nil | X , VARS | ≪wo≫ X , VARS
We use X to range over variables and the symbol≪wo≫ to indicate that a variable is ‘write-once’, i.e.
a sort of late bound constant that can be used, e.g., to store a correlation datum (see OASIS WSBPEL
TC, 2007, Sections 7 and 9 for further details) or a reference to a partner service. Lists of variables
can be inductively built from nil (the empty list) by application of the comma operator ‘‘,’’. Graphical
editors for specifying UML4SOA diagrams usually permit declaring local variables as properties of a
scope activity, but they are not depicted in the corresponding graphical representations. Instead, here
wemake explicit the variables local to a scope because such information is needed for the translation
into COWS. For a similar reason, we show the edge names in the graphical representation of a graph.
Notably, to obtain a compositional translation, each edge is divided in two parts: the part outgoing
from the source activity and the part incoming into the target activity. In the outgoing part a guard is
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Fig. 4. Travel agency scenario: the flight booking service.
specified; this is a boolean expression and can be omitted when it is true. Since UML4SOAmodels are
passed as input to the Venus tool, for the sake of simplicity we adopt as the language of expressions
(used also to specify the expressions argument of the sending actions) the same language accepted by
themodel checkerwehave embedded inVenus. Thus, expressions can be defined by combining values
and (untyped) variables bymeans of standard boolean operators (i.e. and, or), arithmetic operators (i.e.
+,−, /,mod), relational operators (i.e. lt , gt , le, ge,=, ne), and string concatenation (i.e.+).
A GRAPH can be built by using edges to connect initial nodes (depicted by large black spots), final
nodes (depicted as circleswith a dot inside), control flownodes, actions and scopes. It isworth noticing
that for all incoming edges there should exist an outgoing edge with the same name, and vice-versa.
Moreover, we assume that (pairs of incoming and outgoing) edges in orchestrations are pairwise
distinct. These properties are guaranteed for all graphs generated by using any UML graphical editor.
If a receiving action, namely a receive or a receive&send, has no incoming edges, then it starts when
a message is received and remains enabled to wait for other messages (like a UML AcceptEventAction
Object Management Group, 2007a, Section 12.3.1). This kind of action permits specifying persistent
services, i.e. services capable of creating multiple instances to serve several requests simultaneously,
such as the travel agency service depicted in Fig. 2.
Event, exception and compensation handlers are activities linked to a scope by respectively an
event, a compensation and an exception activity edge. An event handler is a scope triggered by an
event in the form of an incoming message. For each event handler, indeed, we assume that its graph
GRAPHevi takes the form REC_ACTION GRAPH. A compensation handler is a scope that is
installed when execution of the related main scope completes and is executed in case of failure to
semantically roll back the execution of this latter scope. An exception handler is an activity triggered
by a raised exception whose main purpose is to trigger execution of the installed compensations.
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Fig. 5. Travel agency scenario: the hotel booking service.
Default event handlers are empty graphs, while default exception and compensation handlers, are,
respectively, as follows:
For readability’s sake, these handlers sometimes will not be represented.
It is worth noticing that handling of exceptions in UML4SOA differs from UML 2.0. Indeed, the
former can execute compensations of completed nested scopes in case of failure, while the latter can
only provide an alternative way to successfully complete an activity in case an exception is raised. See
Section 5 for a formal explanation of the behavior of the UML4SOA construct.
CONTROL_FLOW nodes are the standardUML nodes: fork nodes (depicted by bars with 1 incoming
edge and n outgoing edges), join nodes (depicted by bars with n incoming edges and 1 outgoing edge),
decision nodes (depicted by diamonds with 1 incoming edge and n outgoing edges), andmerge nodes
(depicted by diamonds with n incoming edges and 1 outgoing edge).
Finally, UML4SOA provides seven specialized ACTIONs for exchanging data, for raising exceptions
and for triggering scope compensations. send sends the message resulting from the evaluation of
expressions expr1, . . . , exprn to the partner service identified by p. receive permits receiving a
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Fig. 6. UML4SOA syntax.
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Fig. 7. Venus interface: insertion of UML4SOA diagrams.
message, stored in X1, . . . ,Xn, from the partner service identified by p. Send actions do not block the
execution flow, while receive actions block it until a message is received. The other two actions for
message exchanging, i.e. send&receive and receive&send, are shortcuts for, respectively, a sequence
of a send and a receive action from the same partner and vice-versa. raise causes normal execution
flow to stop and triggers the associated exception handler. compensate triggers compensation of its
argument scope, while compensate_all, only allowed inside a compensation or an exception handler,
triggers compensation of all scopes (in the reverse order of their completion) nested directly within
the same scope to which the handler containing the action is related.
The next section will show how to use Venus for analyzing UML4SOAmodels of services.
3. Venus: a verification environment for UMLmodels of services
As anticipated in the introduction, we tackle the problem of making verification of service
behavioral properties accessible to people that are familiar with UML but not necessarily with formal
verification methods, like process calculi and temporal logics.
To this purpose, we have developed Venus,2 a software tool that aims at automating, as much as
possible, the verification process of service models specified by using the UML4SOA profile, actually
2 Venus is a free software; it can be downloaded at http://rap.dsi.unifi.it/cows and can be redistributed and/ormodified under
the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation.
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hiding from (non-expert) users the underlying formalmethods and theories. This way, developers can
concentrate onmodelling the high-level behaviour of the system and use our tool at an intuitive level
for analysing it. We present the functionalities of Venus by illustrating how the tool can be used to
analyse the travel agency scenario introduced in Section 2.
First of all, Venus requires the user to provide the UML4SOA specification, consisting of a set
of activity diagrams. Each diagram can be edited by using the graphical UML editor MagicDraw3
(No Magic Inc., 2009) where, to allow users to specify UML4SOA activity diagrams, the UML4SOA
profile (Mayer et al., 2008a) must have been previously installed. Figs. 2–5 show examples of
UML4SOA diagrams edited using MagicDraw. More specifically, Venus accepts as an input a set of
files XMI (Object Management Group, 2007b), storing UML4SOA diagrams, that can be automatically
generated by MagicDraw (Fig. 7). For the time being, MagicDraw is the only CASE tool supporting the
UML4SOA profile. However, the use of XMI as the input format makes Venus independent of the tool
used for the high-level system specification. Thus, it should also be able to support files XMI produced
by other tools for which UML4SOA plug-ins would be properly developed.
The user can then select the properties that he wants to verify out of a predefined list of twelve
general properties written in natural language (Fig. 8). The properties focus on the dynamics of
service–client interaction and can be grouped in three categories. Properties of the first group describe
the behavior of the service w.r.t. incoming requests from potential service clients. Regarding this
aspect, a service is said to be
Available if it is always capable to accept an incoming request;
Parallel if, after accepting a request, it can accept further requests before giving a response to the
initial request;
Sequential if it must deliver a response to a request before accepting the next request.
Most of the services are expected to be Available, in order to be able to concurrently provide answers
to a number of clients as large as possible. Of course, to be Available, a servicemust be at least Parallel.
Sometimes however a service can only be sequential, i.e. it cannot servemore than one client at a time
(a cash machine is an example of a sequential service).
Properties of the second group regard the service responses to client requests. A service is said to be
Responsive if it guarantees at least one response to each accepted request;
One-shot if, after a positive response to a request, it cannot accept any further requests;
Single-response if it provides at most one response to each accepted request;
Multiple-response if it provides more than one response to each accepted request;
Broken if it always provides a negative response to each accepted request;
No-response if it never provides a response to each accepted request;
Reliable if it provides a positive response to each accepted request.
Usually a service is expected to be Responsive, in order to guarantee that the clients know the re-
sponse to their requests. One-shot services are not persistent, since they lose their full functionalities
after providing a positive response to a request. Services of this kind usually provide access to limited
resources. To prevent ambiguity, most of the times a service is also expected to be Single-response. In
some cases, however, a service is expected to providemultiple answers to a request. For instance, a ser-
vice responsible for accepting paper submissions to a conference is expected to answer to a submission
with several messages for, respectively, submission acceptance/rejection, paper acceptance/rejection
notification, camera-ready solicitations and so on. A service is, in general, not supposed to be Broken,
i.e. not able to deliver a positive response: this property is usually checked for verifying that, indeed,
it is not satisfied. Similarly, a service is usually supposed to fail the check for the No-response prop-
erty. Notably, to demand a service to be Reliable is a very strong requirement, since it requires every
possible request to have a positive response and in most scenarios this property is supposed not to be
satisfied.
Properties of the third group regard the retraction of a request. A service is said to be
3 We have used MagicDraw Academic Personal Edition 16.5, which is freely available for qualifying institutions. One can
also use MagicDraw Community Edition, which provides a minimal functionality set and is free for developers working on
non-commercial projects.
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Fig. 8. Venus interface: selection of service properties.
Cancelable if it allows to cancel a pending request before a response has been provided;
Revocable if it allows to cancel a request after a positive response has been provided.
In many application domains it is often desirable for a service to provide the possibility to revoke
a request. Cancelable services are said to be fair to the user. Whether a service is supposed to be
Revocable depends on the intendedpolicy. For instance, a company offering an on-line booking service
may decide to provide or not the service with the possibility to retract a booking.
Besides these general properties, expert users can write down additional (domain specific)
properties in the textarea at the bottom of the window (see again Fig. 8). These properties must be
directly expressed as formulae of the temporal logic SocL described in Section 6.
Once the properties to be verified have been selected, the user has to specify, within the
loaded UML4SOA models, which are the relevant operations and what is their role w.r.t. the
selected properties. More specifically, he has to specify the operations representing initial requests,
positive responses, negative responses, cancellations and revocations. Moreover, he can add, for
each operation, the corresponding correlation identifier,4 which can be either a value or a write-
once variable. To shepherd the user for selecting the proper correlation identifier, the tool appends
to the operation name its type (e.g. r for receive, s for send, s&r_r for the receiving activity of a
4 Currently, Venus only supports the usage of a single correlation datum, which is however adequate in most cases.
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Fig. 9. Venus interface: definition of the intuitive semantics of the relevant operations.
send&receive, . . . ) and the number of its arguments. Notice that we need to identify the receiving
and sending activities of send&receive and receive&send actions, since they are equipped with two
distinct tuples of arguments.
In our example (Fig. 9)we specify that an invocation of operation request corresponds to sending an
initial request to the agency service and that the value that will be assigned to variable idwill be used
to correlate subsequent positive responses, negative responses and cancellations to this request (sent
by operations reply, reservationFailure and cancel, respectively). Notice that Venus requires to specify
such operations only for the roles that are needed for checking the properties previously selected
(in our example, initial request, positive response, negative response and cancellation). Moreover,
for each role, more than one operation can be specified by using the associated ‘Add’ button, thus
covering the possibility thatmore than one operationmight play the same role. The formalmechanism
supporting the association of UML4SOA operations to roles is known as abstraction rules and is
described in Section 6. Expert users can also create their own roles and associate operations to them
by specifying suitable abstraction rules in the textarea at the bottom of the window.
Finally, the tool allows the user to check the validity of each property (Fig. 10) and, in case
of a negative result, to require an explanation. Notably, Venus also displays the SocL formula
corresponding to each predefined property that has been selected for model checking.
For instance, the agency service of Section 2 is Available, Parallel, Responsive and Single-Response.
It is not Reliable, since it rejects a request whenever the flight or the hotel cannot be booked. More
interestingly, the service is not Cancelable; the explanation provided by the tool (reported in Fig. 11)
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Fig. 10. Venus interface: verification of the service properties.
shows that this happens because, after the exception abort (activated by the edge e16) is raised, the
event handler containing the operation cancel is disabled before starting the fault handler.
The results of the verification of the above properties are summarized in Fig. 12, where we also
report the execution time (rounded up to seconds) taken by Venus for the evaluation of each property.
The time measures indicate the mean values resulting from multiple experiments on a Dell Optiplex
760 computer (3 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo, 4 GB of memory and Windows Vista operating system).
The verification times depend directly on the performances of CMC, the model checker embedded
within Venus.5 In particular, due to the on-the-fly nature of CMC, the times depend on the size of the
generated underlying model: for the presented case study, such times range from a fraction of second
to the order of very few minutes. Notably, CMC also permits to evaluate many formulae in a single
session, this way the model is generated once and used several times for the evaluation of the various
properties. In our case, evaluating all the eleven properties would have taken about the same time as
evaluating the first one.
Venus architecture. Venus is implemented in Java to guarantee its portability across different
platforms and to exploit the well-established libraries for parsing XML documents and developing
graphical interfaces. As shown in Fig. 13, the tool is composed of threemain components: the graphical
5 Venus currently incorporates the version v0.7r of CMC.
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T
Fig. 11. An excerpt of the explanation provided by CMC of why the agency service is not Cancelable.
Fig. 12. Verification results of the travel agency scenario.
user interface (GUI), implemented by resorting to the Java Swing library (SunMicrosystems, 2009); the
automatic translator from UML4SOA into COWS, called UStoC; the model checker CMC, supporting
verification of SocL formulae over COWS terms.
UStoC takes the files XMI storing the UML4SOA diagrams and encodes them into a COWS term.
The term is then passed as an input to the model checker CMC. Similarly, the properties and the
associations that the user has selected by means of the GUI are translated into, respectively, SocL
formulae and abstraction rules and passed to CMC as an additional input. Finally, CMC checks the
properties and displays the results and, when requested, their explanations to the user.
Fig. 14 shows how the evaluation procedure of Venus (actually, performed by CMC) scales with
respect to the input model size. For this benchmark test, we verify the Responsive property over a
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Fig. 13. Venus architecture.
Fig. 14. Venus performance on checking responsiveness of the summation service.
service that, given two integer numbers x and n, returns their sum calculated by sequentially invoking
n times, with initial value x, a more basic service returning the successor of its input. The experiments
have been repeated by an increasing value of n. The x-axis reports the number of states of the resulting
COWS model for different values of n (e.g. when n = 3, the model has 592 states), while the y-axis
reports the number of seconds taken for verifying the Responsive property (e.g. when n = 3, it takes
14 seconds). For the sake of presentation, since the number of states spans over a large range of values
(because of its rapid rate of growth on the increasing of n), we use a logarithmic scale on the x-axis
and a linear scale on the y-axis.
In our exposition, besides the automatic verification of general properties, wementioned advanced
functionalities of Venus targeted to expert users. These functionalities require the user to be familiar
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Fig. 15. COWS syntax.
with the underlying logical and computational framework of Venus. The purpose of the following
sections is to unveil this framework.
4. COWS: a Calculus for Orchestration of Web Services
COWS (Calculus for theOrchestration ofWeb Services, Lapadula et al., 2007a) is a recently proposed
process calculus for specifying and combining services while modelling their dynamic behaviour. It
provides a novel combination of constructs and features borrowed from well-known calculi such
as non-binding receiving activities, asynchronous communication, polyadic synchronization, pattern
matching, protection, and delimited receiving and killing activities. These features make it easier to
model service instances with shared state, processes playing more than one partner role, stateful
sessions made by several correlated service interactions, and long-running transactions, inter alia.
The syntax of COWS is presented in Fig. 15. It is parameterized by three countable and pairwise
disjoint sets: the set of (killer) labels (ranged over by k, k′, . . .), the set of values (ranged over by
v, v′, . . .) and the set of ‘write-once’ variables (ranged over by x, y, . . .). The set of values includes
the set of names, ranged over by n, m, o, p, . . . , mainly used to represent partners and operations.
Values may also result from evaluation of expressions, ranged over by ϵ. We do not specify the exact
syntax of expressions; we assume that they contain values and variables, but not killer labels (that,
hence, can not be exchanged in communication), and that every expression without variables can be
evaluated.
We use w to range over values and variables, u to range over names and variables, and e to range
over elements, i.e. killer labels, names and variables. The bar ¯ denotes tuples (ordered sequences) of
homogeneous elements, e.g. x¯ is a compact notation for denoting a tuple of variables as ⟨x1, . . . , xn⟩.
We assume that variables in the same tuple are pairwise distinct.We adopt the following conventions
for operators’ precedence: monadic operators bind more tightly than parallel, and prefixing more
tightly than choice. We omit trailing occurrences of 0 andwrite [e1, . . . , en] s in place of [e1] . . . [en] s.
Finally, we write I , s to assign a name I to the term s.
Invoke and receive are the basic communication activities provided by COWS. Besides input
parameters and sent values, both activities indicate an endpoint, i.e. a pair composed of a partner name
p and of an operation name o, through which communication should occur. An endpoint p • o can be
interpreted as a specific implementation of operation oprovidedby the service identified by the logical
name p. An invoke p • o!ϵ¯ can proceed as soon as the evaluation of the expressions ϵ¯ in its argument
returns the corresponding values. A receive p • o?w¯.s offers an invocable operation o along a given
partner name p. Execution of a receive within a choice permits to take a decision between alternative
behaviours. Partner and operation names are dealt with as values and, as such, can be exchanged in
communication (although dynamically received names cannot form the endpoints used to receive
further invocations). This makes it easier to model many service interaction and reconfiguration
patterns.
The delimitation operator is the only binder of the calculus: [e] s binds e in the scope s. The scope of
names and variables can be extended while that of killer labels cannot (as they are not communicable
values). Besides for generating ‘fresh’ private names (as ‘restriction’ in π-calculus Milner et al., 1992),
delimitation can be used for introducing a named scope for grouping certain activities. It is then
possible to associate suitable termination activities to such a scope, as well as ad hoc fault and
compensation handlers, thus laying the foundation for guaranteeing transactional properties in spite
of services’ loose coupling. This can be conveniently done by relying on the kill activity kill(k), that
causes immediate termination of all concurrent activities inside the enclosing [k] (which stops the
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killing effect), and the protection operator {|s|}, that preserves intact a critical activity s also when one
of its enclosing scopes is abruptly terminated.
Delimitation can also be used to regulate the range of application of the substitution generated by
an inter-service communication. This takes placewhen the arguments of a receive and of a concurrent
invoke along the same endpoint match and causes each variable argument of the receive to be
replaced by the corresponding value argument of the invoke within the whole scope of the variable’s
declaration. In fact, to enable parallel terms to share the state (or part of it), receive activities in COWS
do not bind variables.
Execution of concurrent terms is interleaved, but when a kill activity or a communication can be
performed. Indeed, the parallel operator is equipped with a priority mechanism which allows some
actions to take precedence over others. Kill activities are assigned greatest priority so that they pre-
empt all other activities inside the enclosing killer label’s delimitation. In other words, kill activities
are executed eagerly, this way ensuring that, when a fault arises in a scope, (some of) the remaining
activities of the enclosing scope are terminated before starting execution of the relative fault handler.
In fact, activities forcing immediate termination of other concurrent activities are usually used
for modelling fault handling. The same mechanism, of course, can also be used for compensation
handling. Additionally, receive activities are assigned priority values which depend on the messages
available so that, in presence of concurrent matching receives, only a receive using a more defined
pattern (i.e. having greater priority) can proceed. This way, service definitions and service instances
are represented as processes running concurrently, but service instances take precedence over the
corresponding service definition when both can process the same message, thus preventing creation
of wrong new instances. In the end, this permits to correlate different service communications, thus
implicitly creating interaction sessions.
Finally, the replication operator ∗ s permits to spawn in parallel as many copies of s as necessary.
This, for example, is exploited to model persistent services, i.e. services which can create multiple
instances to serve several requests simultaneously.
To clarify the peculiarities of COWS and the usage of the correlationmechanism, we present now a
simple example inspired by the travel agency scenario introduced in Section 2. Consider the following
(persistent) service definition representing the travel agency service6
∗ [xclient, xid, xreqData] agency • request?⟨xclient, xid, xreqData⟩.
( s1 | agency • cancel?⟨xclient, xid⟩.s2 )
where s1 is the term representing the request processing and s2 the term modelling the remaining
constructs of the event handler. Now, suppose that the service runs in parallel with two clients:
( agency • request!⟨clientA, idA, dataA⟩ |<rest of client A>)
| ( agency • request!⟨clientB, idB, dataB⟩ | agency • cancel!⟨clientB, idB⟩ |<rest of client B>)
| ∗ [xclient, xid, xreqData] agency • request?⟨xclient, xid, xreqData⟩.
( s1 | agency • cancel?⟨xclient, xid⟩.s2 )
After a computation step due to the interaction between the service definition and the client A, a new
service instance, identified by the correlation datum idA, is created that runs in parallel with the other
terms:
<rest of client A>
| ( agency • request!⟨clientB, idB, dataB⟩ | agency • cancel!⟨clientB, idB⟩ |<rest of client B>)
| ∗ [xclient, xid, xreqData] agency • request?⟨xclient, xid, xreqData⟩.
( s1 | agency • cancel?⟨xclient, xid⟩.s2 )
| ( s′1 | agency • cancel?⟨clientA, idA⟩.s′2 )
where s′1 and s
′
2 are the terms obtained by replacing variables xclient, xid and xreqData by data clientA, idA
and dataA in s1 and s2, respectively. If the client B also invokes the service, a second instance, identified
6 Actually, this COWS term is an utter simplification of the COWS term resulting from the translation of the UML4SOA
specification in Fig. 2.
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by the correlation datum idB is created:
<rest of client A>
| ( agency • cancel!⟨clientB, idB⟩ |<rest of client B>)
| ∗ [xclient, xid, xreqData] agency • request?⟨xclient, xid, xreqData⟩.
( s1 | agency • cancel?⟨xclient, xid⟩.s2 )
| ( s′1 | agency • cancel?⟨clientA, idA⟩.s′2 )| ( s′′1 | agency • cancel?⟨clientB, idB⟩.s′′2 )
where s′′1 and s
′′
2 are the terms obtained by replacing variables xclient, xid and xreqData by data clientB, idB
and dataB in s1 and s2, respectively. Now, if B invokes the operation cancel provided by the service
agency, then, since the sent message contains the correlation datum idB, the interaction takes place
with the second service instance (it cannot take place with the first instance as the receive argument
⟨clientA, idA⟩ and the message ⟨clientB, idB⟩ do not match):
<rest of client A>
|<rest of client B>
| ∗ [xclient, xid, xreqData] agency • request?⟨xclient, xid, xreqData⟩.
( s1 | agency • cancel?⟨xclient, xid⟩.s2 )
| ( s′1 | agency • cancel?⟨clientA, idA⟩.s′2 )
| ( s′′1 | s′′2 )
Therefore, although two instances are both waiting for a message along the same endpoint agency •
cancel, the message sent by B when invoking the service agency is always delivered to the correct
instance. This behaviour is achieved simply by allowing the two receive activities of the service
definition to share the variable xid,7 used to store the correlation datum.
It is worth noticing that we used the correlation mechanism provided by COWS, on the one hand,
to model the correlation mechanism of UML4SOA (see the role played by write-once variables in
Section 2) and, on the other hand, as synchronization mechanism in several parts of the encoding
presented in Section 5 (see, e.g., the encoding of compensate and SCOPE).
The formal syntax and semantics of COWS provide a rigorous basis for encoding and simulating
UML4SOA models of services. In the next section we will show the actual encoding implemented
in UStoC, one of the Venus components shown in Fig. 13, for transforming UML4SOA diagrams into
COWS terms.
5. A translation of UML4SOA diagrams into COWS terms
The encoding ofUML4SOA diagrams in COWS illustrated herein was firstly presented in Banti et al.
(2009b). The encoding is compositional, in the sense that the translation of an activity diagram is given
by the (parallel) composition of the encodings of all its elements. We first outline the general layout,
then provide specific explanations along with the presentation of each case. We refer the reader to
Fig. 6 for the names of the encoded UML4SOA elements.
At the top level, an orchestration ORC is encoded through an encoding function [[·]] that returns
a COWS term. Function [[·]] is in turn defined by another encoding function [[·]]orcVARS that, given
an element of a diagram, returns a COWS term and has two additional arguments, the name orc
of the enclosing orchestration and the names of the variables defined at the level of the encoded
element. The argument orc is used for translating the communication activities, by specifying who
is sending/receivingmessages. The variable names VARS are necessary for delimiting the scope of the
variables used by the translated element. Variables are fundamental since, as we shall show, they are
used to share received messages among the various elements of a scope and, moreover, they can also
be instantiated as names of partner links.
7 In this specific example, the receive activities of the service definition also share the variable xclient that, hence, contributes
to correlate the two activities. However, we refer to variable xid as the correlation variable since it permits to identify the proper
service instance also when the very same client sends different requests.
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Fig. 16. Encoding of graph elements.
Graphs.We start by providing in Fig. 16 the encoding of the graph elements, i.e. nodes with incoming
and outgoing edges, treating for now actions and scopes as black boxes and focusing on the encoding
of passage of control among nodes. The encoding of aGRAPH is given by the parallel composition of all
the COWS processes resulting from the encoding of its elements. An element of a graph is encoded as
a process receiving and sending signals by its incoming and outgoing edges, respectively. These edges
are, respectively, translated as receive and invoke activities, where each edge name e is encoded by a
COWS endpoint e. A guard is encoded by a COWS (boolean) expression ϵguard. Guards are exchanged
as boolean values between invoke and receive activities and the communication is allowed only if the
evaluation of a guard is true. With the exception of initial and final nodes, the encoding of every
node is a COWS process made persistent by using replication, since a node can be visited several
times in the same workflow (this may occur if the activity diagram contains cycles). Practically, an
initial node is translated as a signal along its outgoing edge. The encoding of a fork node is a COWS
service that can be instantiated by performing a receive activity corresponding to the incoming edge.
After the synchronization, an invoke activity is simultaneously activated for each outgoing edge. The
encoding of a join node is a service performing a sequence of receive activities, one for each incoming
edge, and of an activity invoking its outgoing edge. The order of the receive activities does not matter,
since, anyway, to complete its execution, i.e. to invoke the outgoing edge, synchronization over all
incoming edges is required. In the encoding of a decision node, the endpoints n1, . . . , nn (one for each
outgoing edge) are locally delimited and used for implementing a non-deterministic guarded-choice
that selects one endpoint among those whose guard evaluates to true, thus enabling the invocation
of the corresponding outgoing edge. Amerge node is encoded as a choice guarded by all its incoming
edges; all guards are followed by an invoke of its outgoing edge. Final nodes, when reached, enable a
kill activity kill(kt), where the killer label kt is delimited at scope level, that instantly terminates all
the unprotected processes in the encoding of the enclosing scope (butwithout affecting other scopes).
Simultaneously, the protected term t!⟨⟩ sends a termination signal to start the execution of (possible)
subsequent activities.
An ACTION node with an incoming and an outgoing edge is encoded as a service performing
a receive on the incoming edge followed by the encoding of ACTION and, in parallel, a process
waiting for a termination signal sent from the encoding of ACTION along the internal endpoint t
and then performing an invoke on the outgoing edge. Of course, t is delimited to avoid undesired
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Fig. 17. Encoding of actions.
synchronization with other processes. Such delimitation regulates the scope of the free occurrences
of name t in the various clauses of the encoding definition. A REC_ACTION node with an outgoing
edge and without an incoming one is encoded as a service performing the encoding of REC_ACTION
in parallel with the process handling the termination signal. The encoding of a SCOPE node is similar
to that of an ACTION node, with two main additions. When a SCOPE terminates, the encoding of its
node sends a fresh endpoint n along i enabling the compensation related to the scope, awaits for an
acknowledgement along n and sends its name and n to the local Stack process in case compensation
activities are started (see the encoding of compensation handlers below for further explanations).
After another acknowledgement, it performs an invoke on the outgoing edge. Function scopeName(·),
given a scope, returns its name.
Actions. The encoding of actions is shown in Fig. 17. Sending and receiving actions are translated by
relying on, respectively, COWS invoke and receive activities. Special care must be taken to ensure that
a sentmessage is received onlyby the intended receive action andpartner. For this purpose, in encoded
terms, the action names are used as operation names, and the name orc of the orchestration enclosing
the receive action is used as partner name. A send and a receive action can exchange messages only
if they share the same name.
Action send is an asynchronous call: message ⟨expr1, . . . , exprn⟩ is sent to the partner p and the
process proceeds without waiting for a reply. This is encoded in COWS by an invoke activity sending
the tuple ⟨orc, ϵexpr1 , . . . , ϵexprn⟩, where orc indicates the sender of themessage andwill be used by the
receiver to (possibly) provide a reply. The invoked partner p is rendered either as the link p, in case p is
a constant, or as theCOWS variable xp in case p is awrite-once variable. In parallel, a termination signal
along the endpoint t is sent for allowing the computation to proceed. [[p]]orcVARS is p if≪wo≫p /∈VARS,
and xp otherwise; similarly, each ϵexpri is obtained from expri by replacing each X in the expression
such that≪wo≫X∈VARSwith xX. Unlike send, action receive is a blocking activity, preventing the
workflow to go on until a message is received. It is encoded as a COWS receive along the endpoint
orc • name, with the input pattern a tuple where the first element is the encoding of the link pin p
and the others are either COWS variables xX if≪wo≫ X ∈ VARS or variables X otherwise. Thus, a
message can be received if its correlation data match with those of the input pattern and, in this case,
the other data are stored as current values of the corresponding variables. The encodings of actions
send&receive and receive&send simply result from the composition of the encodings of actions send
and receive.
The behavior, and thus the encoding, of a raise action is somehow similar to that of a final node.
In both cases a kill activity is enabled, in parallel with a protected termination signal invoking an
exception handler. They differ for the killer label and the endpoint along which the termination
signal is sent. In this way, a raise action terminates all the activities in its enclosing scope (where
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kr is delimited) and triggers the related exception handler (by means of signal r!⟨⟩). An exception
can be propagated by an exception handler that executes another raise action. Notably, since default
exception handlers simply execute a raise action and terminate, not specifying exception handlers
results in the propagation of the exception to the further enclosing scope until eventually reaching
the top level and thus terminating the whole orchestration. Action compensate is encoded as an
invocation of the compensation handler installed for the target scope. Action compensate_all is
encoded as an invocation of the local Stack process requiring it to execute (in reverse order w.r.t.
scopes completion) all the compensation handlers installed within the enclosing scope.
Variables, scopes and orchestrations. The encoding of the variables delimited within scopes, scopes
(and related handlers) themselves, and whole orchestrations is shown in Fig. 18. Variables declared
write-once (by means of≪wo≫) directly correspond to COWS variables (as we have seen, e.g., in the
encoding of send ). The remaining variables, i.e. variables that store values and can be rewritten several
times (as usual in imperative programming languages), are encoded as internal services accessible
only by the elements of the scope. Specifically, a variable X is rendered as a service VarX providing
‘read’ and ‘write’ functionalities along the public partner name X. When the service variable is
initialized (i.e. the first time the ‘write’ operation is used), an instance is created that is able to provide
the value currently stored. When this value must be updated, the current instance is terminated and
a new instance is created which stores the new value.
VarX , [xv, xa]X •write?⟨xv, xa⟩.
[n] ( n!⟨xv, xa⟩
| ∗ [x, y] n?⟨x, y⟩. (y!⟨⟩ | [k] (∗ [y′]X • read?⟨y′⟩. {|y′!⟨x⟩|}
| [x′, y′]X •write?⟨x′, y′⟩.
( kill(k) | {|n!⟨x′, y′⟩|} ) ) ) )
Service VarX provides two operations: read, for getting the current value; write, for replacing the
current value with a new one. To access the service, a user must invoke these operations by providing
a communication endpoint for the reply and, in case of write, the value to be stored. The write
operation can be invoked along the public partner X; the first time, it corresponds to initialization
of the variable. VarX uses the delimited endpoint n to store the current value of the variable. This
permits to implement further write operations in terms of forced termination and re-instantiation.
Delimitation [k] is used to confine the effect of the kill activity to the current instance,while protection
{|_|} avoids forcing termination of pending replies and of the invocation that will trigger the new
instance. Notably, the eager semantics of the kill activity guarantees that, once a write operation is
accepted, the current instance is immediately terminated and no operation on the variable is enabled
until it is properly re-instantiated with the new value. In this way, only one write operation can be
executed at a time.
Variables likeXmay (temporarily) occur in expressions used by invoke and receive activitieswithin
COWS terms obtained as a result of the encoding. To get rid of these variables and finally obtain ‘pure’
COWS terms, we exploit the following encodings:
⟨⟨u • u′!ϵ¯⟩⟩ = [m, n1, . . . , nm] if ϵ¯ contains X1, . . . ,Xm
(X1 • read!⟨n1⟩ | . . . | Xm • read!⟨nm⟩
| [x1, . . . xm] n1?⟨x1⟩. . . . . nm?⟨xm⟩. m! ϵ¯ ·{Xi → xi}i∈{1,..,m}
| [x¯] m?x¯. u • u′!x¯ )
⟨⟨p • o?w¯.s⟩⟩ = [x1, . . . , xm] if w¯ contains X1, . . . ,Xm
p • o?w¯ ·{Xi → xi}i∈{1,..,m} .
[n1, . . . , nm] (X1 •write!⟨x1, n1⟩ | . . . | Xm •write!⟨xm, nm⟩
| n1?⟨⟩. . . . . nm?⟨⟩. ⟨⟨s⟩⟩)
where {Xi → xi} denotes substitution of Xi with xi, and endpoint m returns the result of evaluating ϵ¯
(of course, we are assuming that m, ni and xi are fresh).
A SCOPE is encoded as the parallel execution, with proper delimitations, of the processes resulting
from the encoding of all its components. Function vars(·), given a list of variables VARS, returns a
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Fig. 18. Encoding of variables, scopes and orchestrations.
list of COWS variables/names, where a COWS name X corresponds to a variable X in VARS, while a
COWS variable xX corresponds to a variable≪wo≫ X in VARS. Practically, the delimitation of the
variables/names returned by function vars(·) permits to define the scope of the corresponding (write-
once and rewritable) variables. The (private) endpoint r catches signals generated by raise actions and
activates the corresponding handler, by means of the (private) endpoint e. Killer labels kr and kt are
used to delimit the field of action of kill activities generated by the translation of action raise or of final
nodes, respectively, within GRAPH. When a scope successfully completes, its compensation handler
is installed by means of a signal along the endpoint i. Installed compensation handlers are protected
to guarantee that they can be executed despite any exception. Afterwards, the compensation can be
activated by means of the partner name c . Notably, a compensation handler can be executed only
once. After that, the term ∗ [x] c • scopeName?⟨x⟩. stack • end!⟨scopeName⟩ permits to ignore further
compensation requests (by also taking care not to block the compensation chain).
The (protected) Stack service associated to a scope offers, along the partner name stack, three
operations: end to catch the termination of the scope specified as argument of the operation, push
to stack the scope name specified as argument of the operation into the associated Stack, and compAll
that triggers the compensation of all scopes whose names are in Stack. The specification of Stack is as
follows:
[q] ( Lifo | ∗ [x, y] stack • push?⟨x, y⟩. q • push!⟨x, y⟩
| ∗ [x] stack • compAll?⟨x⟩. [loop] ( loop!⟨⟩ | ∗ loop?⟨⟩. Comp ) )
where loop is used to model a while cycle executing Comp. The term Comp pops a scope name
scopeName out of Lifo and invokes the corresponding compensation handler (by means of c •
scopeName!⟨scopeName⟩); in case Lifo is empty, the cycle terminates and a termination signal is sent
along the argument x of the operation compAll.
Comp , [r, e] ( q • pop!⟨r, e⟩ | [y] (r?⟨y⟩. (c • y!⟨y⟩ | stack • end?⟨y⟩. loop!⟨⟩)
+ e?⟨⟩. x!⟨⟩) )
Lifo is an internal queue providing ‘push’ and ‘pop’ operations. Stack can push and pop a scope name
into/out of Lifo via q • push and q • pop, respectively. To push, Stack sends the value to be inserted, while
to pop Stack sends two endpoints: if the queue is not empty, the last inserted value is removed from the
queue and returned along the first endpoint, otherwise a signal along the second endpoint is received.
Each value in the queue is stored as a triple made available along the endpoint h and composed of the
actual value, and two correlation valuesworking as pointers to the previous and to the next element in
the queue. The correlation value retrieved along m is associated with the element on top of the queue,
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if this is not empty, otherwise it is empty.
Lifo , [m, h] (∗ [yv, yr , ye, y]
( q • push?⟨yv, y⟩.[z] (m?⟨z⟩. [c] ( h!⟨yv, z, c⟩ | m!⟨c⟩ | y!⟨⟩ ) )
+ q • pop?⟨yr , ye⟩.[z] (m?⟨z⟩.[yv, yt ] h?⟨yv, yt , z⟩.( m!⟨yt⟩ | yr !⟨yv⟩ )
+ m?⟨empty⟩.( m!⟨empty⟩ | ye!⟨⟩ ) ) )
| m!⟨empty⟩ )
Notice that, because of theCOWS’s (prioritized) semantics,whenever the queue is empty, the presence
of receive m?⟨empty⟩ prevents the synchronization between m!⟨empty⟩ and m?⟨z⟩ from taking place.
The encoding of an orchestration is that of its top-level scope. Function isPersistent(·) returns
either the replication symbol ∗ if the top-level scope directly contains at least a REC_ACTION node
or an empty string otherwise; function edges(·) returns the names of all the edges of the graphs
contained within its argument scope.
The encoding presented in this section permits to transform UML4SOA diagrams, with an informal
semantics, into COWS terms having a formal semantics and a precise behavior. The logic SocL
described in the next section permits the expression of behavioral properties to be checked over the
COWS terms generated from the encoding by means of the model checker CMC.
6. The logic SocL
The service properties informally described in Section 3 require a rigorous definition in order to
be verified over a COWS specification. Venus internally represents these properties as SocL formulae.
SocL is an action- and state-based, branching time logic that uses high level temporal operators drawn
frommainstream logics like CTL (Clarke and Emerson, 1981), ACTL (De Nicola and Vaandrager, 1990)
andACTLW (Meolic et al., 2008).SocLhas been specifically designed to express in an effectiveway dis-
tinctive aspects of services. Indeed, by taking inspiration from the SOC emerging standardWS-BPEL,
SocL permits linking together actions executed as part of the same interaction by means of a correla-
tion mechanism. SocL formulae can be checked over a COWS term by the on-the-fly model checker
CMC. Both SocL and CMC are part of a methodology for verifying functional properties of services
introduced in Fantechi et al. (2008). Here we briefly report the main ingredients of the logic and refer
the interested reader to Fantechi et al. (2008) for a formal account of the semantics of SocL formulae.
The SocL approach takes an abstract point of view: services are thought of as software entities
which may have an internal state and can perform actions, by which they can also interact with each
other. A service is thus characterized in terms of states and propositions that are true over them, and
of state changes and actions performedwhenmoving from one state to another. In our approach, each
proposition expresses the service capability to perform an action. In fact, the interpretation domain
of SocL formulae are Doubly Labelled Transition Systems (L2TSs, De Nicola, 1995), namely extensions of
Labelled Transition Systems (LTSs), where labels represent executed actions, enriched with a labelling
function from states to sets of propositions. An action has a type, e.g. accept a request, provide a
response, etc., and is part of a possibly long-running interaction started when a client firstly invokes
one of the operations exposed by the service. Thus, according to this view, an interaction identifies
a collection of actions, each of them corresponding to a single invocation of a service operation. To
univocally identify an action, since multiple instances of the same interaction can be simultaneously
active because service operations can be independently invoked by several clients, correlation data are
used as a third attribute of service actions.
Correspondingly, the actions of the logic are characterized by three attributes: type, interaction
name, and correlation data. They may also contain variables, called correlation variables, to enable
capturing correlation data used to link together actions executed as part of the same interaction. For
a given correlation variable var , its binding occurrence is denoted by var; all remaining occurrences,
that are called free, are denoted by var . Formally,SocL actions have the form t(i, c), where t is the type
of the action, i is the name of the interaction which the action is part of, and c is a tuple of correlation
values and variables identifying the interaction (i and c can be omitted whenever they do not play
any role). We use α as a generic action (notation · emphasizes the fact that the action may contain
variable binders), and α as a generic action without variable binders.
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Fig. 19. SocL syntax.
For example, action request(tr, 1234, 1) could stand for a request action for starting an (instance
of the) interaction tr which will be identified through the correlation tuple ⟨1234, 1⟩. A response
action corresponding to the request above could be written as response(tr, 1234, 1). Moreover, if
some correlation value is unknown at design time, e.g. the identifier 1, a (binder for a) correlation
variable id can be used instead, as in the action request(tr, 1234, id). A corresponding response action
could be written as response(tr, 1234, id), where the (free) occurrence of the correlation variable
id indicates the connection with the action where the variable is bound. Similarly, actions like
cancel(tr, 1234, id), fail(tr, 1234, id) and undo(tr, 1234, id) could indicate cancellation, failure and
compensation notification for the same request.
The syntax of SocL formulae is presented in Fig. 19. Action formulae are simply boolean
compositions of actions, where tt is the action formula always satisfied, τ denotes unobservable
actions, ¬ and ∧ are the standard logical operators for negation and conjunction, respectively. As
usual, we will use ff to abbreviate¬tt, χ ∨ χ ′ to abbreviate¬(¬χ ∧¬χ ′) and φ1 ⇒ φ2 to abbreviate
¬φ1 ∨ φ2. π denotes a proposition, that is a property that can be true over the states of services.
Propositions have the form p(i, c), where p is the name, i is an interaction name, and c is a tuple of
correlation values and variables identifying i (as before, i and c can be omitted whenever they do
not play any role). E and A are existential and universal (resp.) path quantifiers. X , U and W are the
next, (strong) until and weak until operators drawn from those firstly introduced in De Nicola and
Vaandrager (1990) and subsequently elaborated in Meolic et al. (2008). Intuitively, the formula Xγφ
says that in the next state of the path, reached by an action satisfying γ , the formula φ holds. The
formula φ χUγ φ′ says that φ′ holds at some future state of the path reached by a last action satisfying
γ , while φ holds from the current state until that state is reached and all the actions executed in the
meanwhile along the path satisfy χ . The formula φ χWγ φ′ holds on a path either if the corresponding
formula with the strong until operator holds or if for all the states of the path the formula φ holds and
all the actions of the path satisfy χ .
Other useful logic operators can be derived as usual; those that we use in the sequel are:
• [γ ]φ stands for¬ EXγ ¬φ and means that no matter how a process performs an action satisfying
γ , the state it reaches in doing so will necessarily satisfy φ.
• EFφ stands for φ ∨ E(true ttUttφ) and means that there is some path that leads to a state at which
φ holds; i.e., φ potentially holds.
• EFγ φ stands for E(true ttUγ φ) and means that there is some path that leads to a state at which
φ holds reached by a last action satisfying γ ; if φ is true, we say that an action satisfying γ will
eventually be performed.
• AFγ φ stands forA(true ttUγ φ) andmeans that an action satisfyingγ will be performed in the future
along every path and at the reached states φ holds; if φ is true, we say that an action satisfying γ
is inevitable.
• AGφ stands for¬ EF ¬φ and means that φ holds at every state on every path; i.e., φ holds globally.
6.1. A few templates of service properties specified with SocL
We now show how the service properties that can be selected in Venus can be expressed as
formulae in SocL. These properties use the following service actions8: request(i, var) (accepting
a request), responseOk(i, var) (positively answering to a request), responseFail(i, var) (negatively
8 Notice that, in the SocL formulae (1)–(12) expressing the considered service properties, the variable var will be underlined
when acting as a binder.
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answering to a request), cancel(i, var) (accepting cancellation of a request), undo(i, var) (accepting
revocation of a request), and the following propositions, expressing the potential capability
of the service to perform an action: accepting_ request(i) (capability to accept a request),
accepting_ cancel(i, var) (capability to accept a cancellation) and accepting_ undo(i, var) (capability to
accept a revocation). Notably,Venuswill replace the interaction name iwith the nameof the operation
having the Service Request role, as specified by the user (see Fig. 9); in our travel agency example, i is
replaced by request .
The service properties are formalised as follows:
1. - - Available service - -
AG AF (accepting_ request(i)).
This formula means that in every state the service eventually accepts a request.
2. - - Parallel service - -
AG [request(i, var)]
E(true¬ (responseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) )U accepting_ request(i)).This formula means that the
service can serve several requests simultaneously. Indeed, in every state, if a request is accepted
then, in some future state, a further request for the same interaction can be accepted before giving
a response to the first accepted request. Notably, the responses belong to the same interaction i of
the accepted request and they are correlated by the variable var .
3. - - Sequential service - -
AG [request(i, var)]
A(¬ accepting_ request(i) ttUresponseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var)true).
In this case, the service can serve at most one request at a time. Indeed, after accepting a request,
it cannot accept further requests for the same interaction before replying to the accepted request.
4. - - Responsive service - -
AG [request(i, var)] AFresponseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) true.
The formula states that whenever the service accepts a request, it always eventually provides at
least a (positive or negative) response.
5. - - One-shot service - -
AG [responseOk(i, var)] AG¬ accepting_ request(i).
This formula states that, after the service has provided its functionalities exactly once (i.e. a positive
response to a request has been sent), in all future states, the service cannot accept any further
request.
6. - - Single-response service - -
AG [request(i, var)]
¬EFresponseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) EFresponseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) true.
The formula means that whenever the service accepts a request, it cannot provide two or more
correlated (positive or negative) responses, i.e. it can only provide at most a single response.
7. - -Multiple-response service - -
AG [request(i, var)]
AFresponseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) AFresponseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) true.
Differently from the previous formula, here the service always eventually provides two or more
responses.
8. - - Broken service - -
AG [request(i, var)] AFresponseFail(i,var) true.
This formula states that whenever the service accepts a request, it always eventually provides a
negative response.
9. - - No-response service - -
AG [request(i, var)] ¬EFresponseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var) true.
This formula means that the service never provides a (positive or negative) response to any
accepted request.
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10. - - Reliable service - -
AG [request(i, var)] AFresponseOk(i,var) true.
This formula guarantees that in every state the service eventually provides a positive response to
each accepted request.
11. - - Cancelable service - -
AG [request(i, var)]
A(accepting_ cancel(i, var) ttWresponseOk(i,var)∨responseFail(i,var)true).
This formulameans that the service is ready to accept a cancellation required by the client (fairness
towards the client) before possibly providing a response to the accepted request.
12. - - Revocable service - -
EFresponseOk(i,var) EF(accepting_ undo(i, var))
The meaning of this formula is that, after a positive response has been provided, the service can
eventually accept an undo of the corresponding request. The formula expresses a sort of weak
revocability, i.e. it does not guarantee that the service can always accept anundoof the request after
providing the response (see Fantechi et al., 2010 for a formulation of this stronger interpretation).
In Fantechi et al. (2008), semantically slightly different interpretations of the properties are
provided. Users familiarwithSocLmay useVenus to verify these alternative versions of the properties
or write down their own formulae from scratch.
6.2. CMC and the abstraction mechanism
As mentioned above, the interpretation domain of SocL are L2TS. Hence, a model checker engine
that assists the verification process of SocL formulae has to rely on such internal representation.
While, in principle, a UML4SOA specification could have been directly translated using this class
of transition systems, these translations would have lacked compositionality and, moreover, the
obtained transition systems could have been non-finite. By relying on the process calculus COWS,
instead, a service scenario is translated as the parallel composition of the translations of the individual
services. The terms of a process calculus are syntactically finite, even when the corresponding
semantic model, usually defined in terms of labelled transition systems, is not. Therefore, the tool
CMC has been specifically developed for checking SocL formulae over L2TSs generated from COWS
terms.
A fundamental mechanism for filling the gap between COWS terms and L2TSs is based on the so-
called abstraction rules. In fact, the SocL formulae previously presented are stated in terms of ‘abstract’
actions and propositions, meaning that, e.g., a reservation is requested or the system is ready to accept
a reservation request. In otherwords, the propertieswewant to verify are formalized asSocL formulae
in a completely independent way of the service specification. The abstraction rules permit to link
these abstract actions and propositions to the ‘concrete’ operations of COWS specifications, which in
their turn encode UML4SOA operations. We refer the interested reader to Fantechi et al. (2008) for a
comprehensive account of this step.
To automatically generate the abstraction rules required as input by CMC, Venus shepherds the
user into providing the necessary data by selecting theUML4SOA operations (and, consequently, their
COWS encoding) corresponding toSocL action types (i.e. accept a request, provide a positive response,
etc.). Such information are also used to instantiate the formulae templates presented in Section 6.1 to
the actual formulae checked by CMC.
7. Concluding remarks and related work
We have presented Venus, a tool for automatic verification of service models specified by using
the UML4SOA profile. The tool implements an automatic translation of UML4SOA activity diagrams
into the process calculus COWS and shepherds the user in the specification of properties, internally
represented as SocL formulae. The properties are then checked over the COWS term resulting from
the translation by exploiting the model checker CMC. Venus allows users without any knowledge
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of COWS and SocL to select the properties they want to check out of a predefined list of general
properties whose meaning is intuitively explained in natural language. An expert user familiar with
SocL (but not necessarily with COWS) can also define his own properties directly as SocL formulae.
Both expert and non-expert users are shepherded by the tool into selectingwhich concrete operations
in the considered service scenario correspond to the abstract actions and propositions in the SocL
formulae.
Related work. There are several works in the literature whose goal is the automatic verification of
UML specifications. However, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first effective (although still
demonstrative) tool allowing a user solely familiar with UML activity diagrams to verify properties
of services. In particular none of the existing works considers service-oriented UML profiles and,
most importantly, implements facilities for formalising properties of services, like the abstraction
mechanism and the menu of predefined properties presented in this work.
Latella et al. (1999) and Latella and Massink (2001) presents a translation of UML State Chart
diagrams (which differ from activity diagrams) into Promela, the input language of the Spin
verification environment (Holzmann, 2003). A translation of UML state chart diagrams is also at the
base of Jürjens and Shabalin (2004), which focusses on security aspects of system specifications. ter
Beek et al. (2008), Dong et al. (2001) and Knapp et al. (2002) present alternative verification tools
implementing a semantic for UML state chart diagrams. Compton et al. (2000) describes a verification
tool for both state chart and activity diagrams. However, the tool supports version 1.0 of UML, rather
than the current version 2.0. Arons et al. (2004) proposes a framework for automatic verification of
UML statemachine specifications based on (semi-)automated theorem proving over a linear temporal
logic. However, the proposed approach requires a user to have high skills in automated theorem
proving techniques and the ability to devise creative solutions related to the specific model and
properties, while our approach tries to provide a verification environment easily accessible also to
non-expert users.
An environment for verifying UML diagrams based on the VIATRA framework (VIATRA2 Developer
Team, 2009) is presented in Csertán et al. (2002). However, to the best of our knowledge, VIATRA
does not support the UML4SOA profile. The same applies for the various graph transformation tools
considered in Varró et al. (2008) that translate high-level UML activity diagrams into CSP processes.
The problem of defining a formal semantics for (subsets of) UML activity diagrams has been
tackled by many authors. A largely followed approach is based on (extensions of) Petri Nets (see,
e.g., Eichner et al., 2005; Störrle and Hausmann, 2005). However, although Petri Nets can be a
natural choice for encoding workflows, they seem not to fit well for such constructs as compensation,
message correlation and shared variables, that are more relevant for UML4SOA. Other approaches
have introduced operational semantics through transition systems (e.g. ter Beek et al., 2008; Crane
and Dingel, 2008) and stochastic semantics (Tabuchi et al., 2005), and transformation into SMV
specifications (Beato et al., 2005), but none of them considers the UML4SOA profile and, above
all, seems to be adequate for encoding its specific constructs. Regarding UML4SOA, a software tool
translating UML4SOA models into WS-BPEL is presented in Mayer et al. (2008b). The translation,
however, does not apply to all possible UML4SOA diagrams and is not compositional. Furthermore,
WS-BPEL code does not have a univocal semantics (see Lapadula et al., 2008), thus the translation does
not provide a formal semantics to UML4SOA models. Indeed, as far as we know, our encoding is the
first (transformational) semantics of UML4SOA.
As the target of our encoding, we have singled COWS out ofmany recently proposed process calculi
for SOAs (as e.g. Guidi et al., 2006; Lanese et al., 2007; Boreale et al., 2008) because of its distinctive
primitives andmechanisms, specifically the termination constructs and the correlationmechanism. In
fact, kill activities are suitable for representing ordinary and exceptional process terminations, while
protection permits to naturally represent exception and compensation handlers that are supposed to
run after normal computations terminate. Even more crucially, the correlation mechanism permits
to automatically correlate messages belonging to the same interaction, preventing to mix messages
fromdifferent service instances. On the one hand, compared to other correlation-oriented calculi (like,
e.g., (Guidi et al., 2006)), COWS seems to be more adequate since it relies on more basic constructs.
On the other hand, using a session-based calculus (e.g. Lanese et al., 2007; Boreale et al., 2008) for
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defining a transformational semantics ofUML4SOA appears to bemore problematic and less intuitive,
mainly becauseUML4SOA is not session-oriented, thus the specific features of these calculi are of little
help. Furthermore, besides CMC, COWS provides other verification tools, such as e.g. the type system
of Lapadula et al. (2007b) for confidentiality properties, the static analysis of Bauer et al. (2008) for
information flowproperties and the stochastic extension of Prandi andQuaglia (2007) for quantitative
properties. These tools, and the translation of UML4SOA diagrams into COWS we have illustrated in
this paper, could thus permit to extend our framework to comprise the verification of other classes of
properties.
Future work. There are a number of directions along which the presented work could evolve and be
extended.
Recently, another UML profile for designing SOAs, named SoaML (Object Management Group,
2008), has been introduced.With respect toUML4SOA, SoaML ismore focused on architectural aspects
of services and relies on the standard UML 2.0 activity diagrams without further specializing them.
A new version of the UML4SOA profile has been then released, which basically integrates Protocol
StateMachine Diagrams formodelling services external to a given orchestration.We plan to study the
feasibility of extending our encoding, and the related implementation, to the new UML4SOA profile.
The current prototypical implementation of Venus still lacks the efficiency for managing the
analysis of large system specifications, as e.g. the case study analysed in Fantechi et al. (2010). The
way to improve this aspect of the tool it is to optimize both the automatic translation of UML4SOA
diagrams into COWS terms, in order to obtain amore tractable COWS specification, and the underlying
CMCmodel checker.
Moreover, Venus only provides a fixed set of predefined properties. We plan to extend this
functionality by allowing a user to load sets of customized predefined properties written in proper
text files (by means of an interface similar to that shown in Fig. 7). This way, expert users may define
new predefined properties (each of which expressed both in natural language and in SocL) that can
be subsequently used also by non-expert users. Another useful facility for non-expert users could be
to allow the specification of user-defined properties also in pseudo-natural language, beside the SocL
temporal logic.
Finally,Venus already provides an explanation for violation of a propertywhen the ‘Explain’ button
is pressed. Thanks to the abstractionmechanism, actions used within such an explanation are already
expressed in terms of UML4SOA operations. However, to provide a feedback easily understandable
also by non-expert users and help them to improve the original UML4SOA specification, explanations
generated by CMC need to be further refined.
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